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Hours Reductions as Work-Sharing 
OVER  THE PAST century,  annual hours per worker have been falling  in 
industrialized countries.  This fall could be influenced by labor supply, 
through an income  effect,  as workers have become  richer, but it could 
also be influenced by labor demand,  as the increasingly  skill-intensive 
nature of jobs  has reduced the number of hours for which workers can 
maintain  high  productivity.  For  most  of  the  period,  the  motivation 
expressed  by those campaigning  for shorter hours has been to improve 
health and safety,  or simply  to improve the quality of life.  When con- 
cern  about the  level  of  unemployment  has  been  high,  however,  the 
declared motivation has sometimes  been "work-sharing,"  which is the 
hope  (or conviction)  that a reduction  in hours per worker will  spread 
the available work around and hence increase employment.  This moti- 
vation was important during the Great Depression  in the United States 
and other countries,  and it has resurfaced in Europe since  unemploy- 
ment began to rise around 1975. 
Supporters of  work-sharing  have  usually  focused  on reductions  in 
the standard weekly  hours of full-time  workers,  that is,  the number of 
hours beyond  which  an overtime  premium  must  be  paid.  However, 
hours reductions sometimes  take the form of fewer shifts per month or 
increased  vacation  time.  In the United  States,  the overtime  premium 
has been seen  as the most relevant tool  for achieving  reductions.  The 
Netherlands is unusual, in that increasing part-time work has been seen 
as a means of reducing  hours.  The debate is currently most topical  in 
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France and Italy,  where the governments  have presented work-sharing 
proposals  in  1998.  Both  plans  seek  to  raise  employment  by  cutting 
standard hours to  thirty-five  per week  within  four years.  In western 
Germany, the debate was largely carried out in the 1980s and reductions 
in the standard week justified  on work-sharing grounds are ongoing. 
In this paper I focus  on work-sharing through the reduction of hours 
of full-time  workers,  with emphasis  on the contrasting experiences  of 
the  United  States,  Germany,  and France.1 Popular confidence  in the 
ability  of  work-sharing  to  increase  employment  is  based  on the  idea 
that the amount of work that needs to be done is fixed.  However,  as I 
show below,  if a reduction in hours implies  an increase in the marginal 
cost  of  production  at the original  level  of  output,  optimal output will 
fall  (the  scale  effect),  tending  to  reduce  demand  for  inputs.  Higher 
marginal labor costs  will  also cause  substitution  away from labor and 
toward other inputs.  Thus both total hours of  work and employment 
could  fall,  even  if the hourly wage remains unchanged.  The effect  on 
actual hours per worker is also ambiguous.  Another important consid- 
eration is associated  movement  in the real hourly wage.  Although  one 
might imagine that leisure must be "bought"  with a lower hourly wage, 
unions involved  in work-sharing have campaigned for increases  in the 
hourly wage to "compensate"  for the lost hours. Such a rise in the real 
hourly wage  would reduce the likelihood  of employment  gains. 
Existing  evidence  suggests  that employment  declines  as a result of 
work-sharing,  raising the possibility  that output has likewise  fallen.  In 
the  case  of  Germany,  the  unions  appear to  have  been  successful  in 
negotiating  increases  in the real hourly wage,  which  has contributed 
both to the overall  trend of  rising  real wages  and to the reduction  in 
employment  in  work-sharing  sectors.  New  analysis  presented  below 
indicates  that reductions  in the  standard hours of  German men  have 
reduced the labor supply of their wives. 
The industrial relations literature suggests that in most countries hours 
reductions are initiated by workers, and that union strength may be  an 
important determinant of  which countries experience the largest reduc- 
tions. However,  workers in different countries may desire different num- 
bers of  hours, due to differing wage  levels  or distributions or differing 
1. Eastern  Germany  has higher standard  hours  than western  Germany  and its labor 
market issues are different. All data and discussions in this paper refer to western 
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unemployment rates. The number of hours desired by employers may also 
vary in different countries, due to variation in industrial (and hence tech- 
nological)  composition,  in fixed per worker costs,  and in overtime pre- 
miums. Such differences could affect the degree to which employers resist 
workers' attempts  to reduce hours. Evidence for Germany presented below 
shows  that work-sharing has not been particularly effective  in bringing 
actual hours in line with desired hours. This suggests that the unions may 
have been motivated by concerns about employment, as claimed, or by a 
desire to increase wages more than would have been possible except under 
the guise of work-sharing. The possibility that hours were reduced because 
employers wanted them to be seems unlikely, given the continued public 
opposition of employers to work-sharing. 
I begin by summarizing statistics on hours and employment  for sev- 
eral countries,  and then  describe  work-sharing  in the United  States, 
Germany, and France. I then discuss  existing  theoretical and empirical 
knowledge  about work-sharing and present some evidence  on the effect 
of  work-sharing on German labor supply.  I examine  possible  reasons 
for differences  across  countries  in levels  of  and changes  in full-time 
hours and present evidence  on the effect  of  German work-sharing  on 
the convergence  of actual and desired hours. 
International Comparison of Hours 
Figure 1 shows trends in annual hours per worker (that is, total hours 
worked in the year divided  by average employment)  for various coun- 
tries,  based on data from the Organisation for Economic  Co-operation 
and Development  (OECD).  Since the method of calculation varies con- 
siderably by country,  the levels  of hours are not comparable and only 
trends are shown.  Rather than changes in employment rates, these num- 
bers in general reflect changes in overtime hours, standard hours, short- 
time work,  and vacation  time,  as well  as changes  in the proportion of 
part-time workers and in their hours.2 
2.  See Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Development,  Employment  Out- 
look, various issues, for detailed notes on calculation methods, and in a few cases, 
changes in these methods. Even trends  may not be fully comparable:  for example, for 
the Netherlands,  hours do not include overtime; and some countries include the self- 
employed  while others  do not. The French  data  are  produced  within  the national  accounts ON) 
ON~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
In  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~I Jennifer  Hunt  343 
The most striking point about the figure is that the United States 
differs from almost all other countries:  in 1996 annual  hours were the 
same as they had been in 1960, after a fairly small dip, while in all 
other countries except Australia, they fell by at least 10 percent over 
the periods for which OECD data are available.3  The largest declines 
were in western  Germany,  France, and the Netherlands. 
The statistics  presented  in figure 1 can be converted  into an index of 
annual hours per person above the age of compulsory schooling by 
using employment-to-population  ratios  provided  by the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The employment-to-population  ratios themselves are 
shown in figure  2. In the United States, this ratio was relatively low in 
1960, but began an upward  trend  in the late 1970s, driven  by increased 
female employment  rates. The United States currently  has the highest 
employment  rate  of the countries  pictured.  Canada  and  the Netherlands 
are  the only other  countries  where  employment  rates  did not fall. Figure 
3 shows the product of the employment rates and annual hours per 
worker, or annual  hours per adult. As a result of the rising American 
employment  rate, these plots show greater  disparity  between  the United 
States and other  countries, except Canada  and  the Netherlands,  than is 
seen in figure 1. Hours  per adult  have increased  by more  than 10 percent 
in the United States since 1960, according  to this measure. 
The trends  in figure 1 are somewhat  misleading  if one is interested  in 
hours  reductions  related  to work-sharing,  since for some countries  they 
are strongly  influenced  by increases  in part-time  work. Linda Bell and 
Richard  Freeman  calculate  what proportion  of the hours  reductions  for 
1983-94 from  the OECD  data  may be attributed  to a rising  share  of part- 
time workers.4  For the Netherlands  and the United Kingdom,  the rising 
framework.  The German  data are based on establishment  survey estimates of weekly 
full-time hours, adjusted  for factors such as public holidays, sickness, overtime, and 
part-time  work. The United States data originate  from data on hours paid for nonfarm 
employees  from  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS), Current  Employment  Statistics, which 
are converted  to hours worked using the Hours at Work survey, and then extended  to 
the whole economy using the Current  Population  Survey (both surveys by the BLS). 
Note that comparable  statistics  on levels of hours  since 1982 for countries  in the Euro- 
pean Union are available  from Eurostat. 
3.  Other  sources  of data  for Australia  suggest that  hours  fell by 5 to 6 percent  during 
the period 1948-82; Dawkins and Baker  (1994, p. 51). 
4.  Bell and Freeman  (1996). Bell (1995) shows that if the OECD data on hours 
levels are taken at face value, little of the intercountry  variation  is due to variation  in 
part-time  share;  rather,  it appears  mostly due to variation  in full-time hours. 0n 
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share  of part-time  workers  substantially  overpredicts  the fall in hours,  for 
France  it fully explains  the fall, while for Germany  and Italy it explains 
about  a quarter  to a third  of the fall, with changes  in hours  of full-timers 
being the dominant  effect.5  Thus  it is clear  that  data  on full-time  workers 
are  required. 
The only internationally  comparable  data  on full-time hours  that are 
not limited to the countries  of the European  Union pertain  to blue collar 
workers  in manufacturing.  The  German  employers'  federation,  the Bun- 
desvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbande,  has calculated 
standard  annual  hours based on standard  weekly hours, vacation days, 
and holidays since 1984. These numbers  therefore  do not account for 
overtime  or short-time,  sickness, or dual  job holding. Annual  hours  for 
1995 and their decomposition, as well as the changes in annual  hours 
since 1984, are shown in table 1. The countries are ordered  by 1995 
annual  hours, with western  Germany  at the top (1,602 hours)  and  Japan, 
22 percent higher in hours, at the bottom (1,957).  Germany  has the 
shortest standard  work week and the largest number  of vacation days, 
both  of which contribute  to its very low annual  hours. The United States 
is a low outlier in terms  of vacation  days, and  this accounts  for its high 
annual  hours. 
Japan  and Germany  have had the largest falls in hours since 1984, 
with reductions of 9 to 10 percent. There has been essentially no re- 
duction in Sweden or the United States. France  is in the middle of the 
table, in terms of level of hours, and had one of the smaller  reductions 
between 1984 and 1995. In fact, for purposes  of comparison,  the period 
before 1983 in France  is of interest, as there has been little reduction 
since  1982, when there was a legislated reduction in working time 
(discussed further  below). Between 1973 and 1983, part-time  employ- 
ment rose from 5.9 to 9.6 percent  in France, while in Germany  it rose 
from 10.  1 to 12.6 percent. Since the declines in overall annual  hours 
per worker  in figure 1 are similar for the two countries, this indicates 
that  full-time hours  probably  fell faster  in Germany  than  in France  over 
the same period.6 
5.  Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and  Development,  "Flexibility  of Work- 
ing Hours:  Latest  Trends  and  Policy Initiatives," Employment  Outlook,  1998 (forthcom- 
ing) provides  a very similar  decomposition. 
6.  The part-time  data come from Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and De- 1j. 
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Figure 4 shows  BLS  standardized unemployment  rates in the coun- 
tries covered  in figure  1.  An important difference  between  American 
and European unemployment,  not reflected in the graphs, is the much 
shorter duration of unemployment  spells  in the United  States.  This  is 
one reason why unemployment  has been a higher profile issue  in Ger- 
many than the United States since the 1980s,  despite similar unemploy- 
ment rates.7 Countries in which the principal motivation for reductions 
in full-time hours, whether initiated by unions or government,  has been 
work-sharing-and  hence  unemployment-include  Austria,  Belgium 
(where  government  initiatives  were  mostly  unsuccessful),  Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom,  and the United States have not undertaken significant 
cuts in hours in the name of work-sharing,  despite high unemployment 
in some cases; while in Norway,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and Japan, low 
unemployment  rates have made the debate less  relevant until recently. 
Work-Sharing in Three Countries 
In this section,  I describe  work-sharing arrangements in the United 
States,  France,  and Germany. 
The United States 
Work-sharing in the United States during the past twenty-five  years 
is quickly  summarized,  since  the idea has attracted little  interest.  Al- 
though it is still a topic of interest to unions,  the reduction of hours is 
not a high priority and is not linked to concerns  about unemployment. 
Furthermore, union influence  has steadily  declined  over this period- 
membership fell from 27.3  percent of nonfarm workers in 1970 to 16.7 
percent in 1995-and  bargaining has always been very decentralized.8 
The worldwide  web page of  the AFL-CIO,  the umbrella organization 
for the  unions,  discusses  hours under the  rubric of  alternative  work 
schedules.  A shorter work week with full wage  compensation  (that is, 
velopment, Employment  Outlook, various issues. The levels are not fully comparable 
across  countries. 
7.  Note also that  the official German  rates  overstate  "unemployment"  with respect 
to the BLS and the closely related  International  Labour  Organisation  concepts. 
8.  For union membership,  see Blanchflower  (1996). 350  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
no loss  in weekly  pay) is eighth on the list of strategies for improving 
the quality  of  life,  but in the example  given  the employer  is  a union 
local.  A shorter work week  with less  than full  compensation  is noted 
as a possibility  for  avoiding  layoffs,  but the example  given  is  of  an 
employer  in Canada. 
The  only  legislation  or institution  with  important implications  for 
work-sharing  in  the  United  States  is  a  provision  of  the  Fair  Labor 
Standards Act,  introduced in 1940, that mandates an overtime premium 
of  50  percent.  This  provision  originally  covered  only  20  percent  of 
workers,  but by  1979 it covered  74 percent of nonsupervisory  person- 
nel,  and in 1985 it was further extended  to state and local  government 
employees.9  The standard work week associated with this premium has 
remained at forty hours since  its introduction.  The motivation  of  this 
legislation  is  work-sharing:  to reduce  hours per worker by  deterring 
employers  from  using  overtime,  hence  leading  them  to  increase 
employment. 
Germany 
In the  case  of  Germany,  work-sharing  must be  understood  in the 
context  of  labor relations.  Union  membership  stood  at 33  percent  in 
1993, the same proportion as in 1970, but the terms of union settlements 
covered  about 90  percent,  as conditions  negotiated  by the unions  are 
extended  to nonmembers.10 German unions bargain at the regional  in- 
dustry level,  but within an industry, agreements across regions are very 
similar-in  many  cases,  identical.  Since  World  War II,  two  unions 
have spearheaded drives to reduce standard hours for full-time workers: 
the 4 million  member union for metal working  and related industries, 
IG  Metall,  and the  printing  union,  IG  Druck.  Reduced  hours  have 
typically  been obtained in these sectors first, and then spread to others. 
A wave  of hours reductions  that began in the  1960s  and continued 
into  the  early  1970s  led,  by  the  mid-1970s,  to  convergence  across 
industries  to  a forty-hour  standard week  with  six  weeks  of  vacation. 
This remained the norm for about ten years,  as is indicated in figure 1 
by the stability of annual hours during this period. In the climate of low 
unemployment that existed at the time, the motivation for the reductions 
9.  Rosenberg  (1994). 
10. For membership  and coverage, see Blanchflower  (1996). Jennifer Hunt  351 
was quality of life.  In 1982-83  IG Metall resumed a campaign, initiated 
in 1978,  for a reduction in the work week to below  forty hours and was 
successful  in  1984,  after a lengthy  strike.  The  38.5-hour  week  was 
introduced in the metal-working  and printing industries in 1985.  In the 
1980s  the ostensible  motivation  for reductions in hours was quite dif- 
ferent: to reduce unemployment,  which had risen greatly in Germany. 
Reductions  in standard hours spread to other sectors,  including  ser- 
vices.  Typically,  negotiations  led to a multiyear agreement on stepwise 
reductions  in hours,  while  monthly  wages  continued  to be  bargained 
over each year. The unions usually claimed to have achieved  their aim 
of  "full  wage  compensation,"  commonly  demanded  by  European 
unions  in work-sharing  campaigns.  The exact  meaning  of  the term is 
open to debate,  but at a minimum  it means  that in the short run, the 
nominal hourly wage  should rise enough to offset  the decline  in hours, 
keeping  monthly  pay the same.  IG Metall,  still  in the vanguard,  suc- 
cessfully  completed its last set of reductions in 1995, when the standard 
work week was cut to thirty-five hours. The union has now set its sights 
on a thirty-two-hour week. 
German employers  have  resisted  the reductions  in standard hours, 
claiming  that they diminish  competitiveness  in international markets. 
This is still the position of the umbrella organization for the employers' 
federations,  the  Bundesvereinigung  der Deutschen  Arbeitgeberver- 
binde.11  Employers'  compensation  for  the  reductions  has  been  in- 
creased  flexibility  in  the  use  of  hours.  In some  cases,  for  example, 
standard hours no longer have to be spread evenly  over each day of the 
week to avoid overtime payments,  but can vary from week to week,  as 
long as they average to the agreed weekly  standard hours over a window 
of some months.  The union contracts allow these flexibility  provisions 
to be introduced at the plant level,  subject to agreement by the plant's 
works council,  but surveys  find that few  firms have adopted them.12 
11. See "Arbeitszeit ist zu kurz und unflexibel" (working time is too short and 
inflexible)  on the worldwide  web page of the Bundesvereinigung  der Deutschen  Arbeit- 
geberverbande  (www.arbeitgeber.de). 
12. See Bosch and  others  (1988); Promberger  (1994). For further  descriptions  of the 
evolution  of hours  in Germany,  see Bosch (1990, 1993). 352  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1  998 
France 
In a manner somewhat  similar  to  Germany,  France experienced  a 
convergence  to the forty-hour week  through a series  of agreements  at 
the industry level  over the period 1968-78.  Legislation  passed in 1969 
set a norm of  four weeks  of  vacation.  Rising  unemployment  coupled 
with  the  cessation  of  hours  reductions  through  industry  agreements 
made work-sharing an issue in the presidential and parliamentary elec- 
tion campaigns of  1981. The resulting socialist  government outlined an 
objective  of  reducing  standard hours to thirty-five per week  over five 
years. This spurred negotiations  at the industry level,  but little progress 
was made,  due to resistance  from employers  and divisions  among the 
three national unions,  the Conf6deration Generale du Travail, the Con- 
f6deration Francaise Democratique du Travail, and the Force Ouvriere. 
Therefore in 1982 the government intervened with new legislation  that 
cut standard weekly  hours to thirty-nine with full wage compensation, 
introduced  a fifth paid week  of  vacation,  and reduced the retirement 
age from sixty-five  to sixty.  Figure  1 indicates  a large drop in annual 
hours for France in 1982. 
Within  a year,  this  law  had been  judged  a failure  by  all  parties, 
apparently because  the unemployment  rate continued  to rise.  Critics 
included both opponents of work-sharing and proponents of variants of 
work-sharing,  for example,  with only  partial wage  compensation.  In- 
stead of legislating  a further reduction in hours in 1983, Prime Minister 
Pierre Mauroy merely  called  on employers  and unions  to continue  to 
reduce hours.  In the following  decade,  successive  governments  intro- 
duced  various  incentive  plans  to  get  firms to  reduce  standard hours. 
These plans typically offered temporary cuts in social security payments 
to firms that could agree with unions on (usually large) cuts in standard 
hours and could demonstrate an increase in employment.  The response 
from firms was not large. 
Meanwhile,  French employers  took  the offensive  in their negotia- 
tions  with unions,  seeking  more flexibility  in the use of hours,  as de- 
scribed  for Germany.  Unsuccessful  in their initial  attempts at the in- 
dustry level,  they had some success later in the 1980s at the firm level- 
where unions  are weaker or not represented-and  agreed to hours re- 
ductions  in return. 13 
13. For further  description  of work-sharing  in France,  see Boulin (1993); Cette and Jennifer Hunt  353 
Effects of Work-Sharing on Employment, 
Wages, and Labor Supply 
A very simple model of static labor demand leads to some unambig- 
uous  predictions  of  the effect  of  standard hours changes.  Consider  a 
firm that chooses  hours per worker, employment,  and the levels  of other 
inputs to maximize  profit and takes standard hours,  the wage,  and the 
price of other inputs as given.  The existence  of fixed per worker costs 
tends to make employers  want higher hours,  in order to spread these 
costs  over more hours of  work.  In some  countries,  however,  workers 
who  fall  below  a threshold  in hours are exempt  from certain payroll 
taxes, which makes low hours attractive for the firm.  14  Moreover, while 
in some  industries  high  hours might  enhance  a firm's  ability  to keep 
capital equipment from being idle,  in other industries this might not be 
so.  Worker fatigue  is  another factor  that might  push  firms to  prefer 
lower hours. And if low hours per worker permit the introduction of an 
additional  shift,  this  arrangement might  allow  equally  long  or longer 
use of capital equipment. 
Suppose that the firm initially chooses  hours per worker greater than 
standard hours. The overtime hours are subject to a wage premium.  If 
standard hours are exogenously  reduced, the firm will experience a scale 
effect  that will  tend to reduce demand for all inputs,  since more of the 
hours must be paid at the overtime premium. The firm will also substi- 
tute away from labor toward other inputs and away from workers toward 
hours per worker: the marginal cost of a new worker has risen, because 
more of the worker's hours are subject to the overtime premium, while 
the marginal cost of an extra hour of overtime has remained constant. 
Thus employment  and total hours worked fall unambiguously,  but the 
effect  on hours per worker is ambiguous. 
This simple model is sensitive  to small changes.  For example,  sup- 
pose that the overtime premium rises with overtime because long over- 
time spills into the weekend,  when higher premiums must be paid. The 
effect on employment  of reducing standard hours becomes  ambiguous, 
Tadd6i  (1997); Fridenson  (1993); Gauvin  (1994). Tchobanian  (1995) discusses worker 
representation  at the firm  level. 
14. See Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development, "Flexibility of 
Working Hours: Latest Trends and Policy Initiatives," Employment  Outlook, 1998 
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since the direction of substitution between workers and hours becomes 
unclear.  A  firm whose  optimal  hours  are below  standard hours  but 
which is constrained to choose standard hours will increase employment 
when  standard hours are reduced.  Thus even  a simple  model  has am- 
biguous  predictions,  particularly for the economy  as a whole. 15 
In bringing the model  closer  to European reality,  it is important to 
endogenize  the  hourly  wage.  In union  models  such  as those  of  Lars 
Calmfors,  Michael Hoel,  and George Houpis,  when standard hours are 
cut exogenously  the direction of the wage change is ambiguous. 16 If the 
reduction makes hours closer to the workers' optimum level,  the value 
of  additional  leisure  may  allow  the  wage  to  fall.  On the other side, 
forces  working  to  raise  the  hourly  wage  include  the  fact  that lower 
monthly  income  reduces  the disutility  of  unemployment.  Calmfors  is 
the  only  one  to  tackle  the  problem  of  endogenizing  the  changes  in 
standard hours,  and his model leaves  predictions  ambiguous. 
A much debated issue  is whether workers become  more productive 
(controlling  for the levels  of other inputs) when they work fewer hours. 
This is very difficult to measure in most settings.  Moreover,  the effect 
on employment  of  a productivity  increase  following  a cut in standard 
hours is  ambiguous,  despite  the almost  universal  popular assumption 
that it would tend to reduce employment.  Since this is,  in effect,  a case 
of capital-saving  technological  progress,  the familiar ambiguity in the 
effect  of  technology  on  employment  applies:  a large  scale  effect  or 
substitution from capital could make the effect  positive. 
The effects  on labor supply depend on whether hours shift toward or 
away  from desired  hours and on what happens to the wage.  If hours 
move  away  from desired  hours,  workers may quit or take up second 
jobs.  The effect  on spousal  labor supply will  depend on the direction 
of the wage change and on how spouses  interact in household  produc- 
tion and consumption. 
Empirical  Findings for  Wages and Employment 
The difficulty  with analysis  of most cases  of reductions in standard 
hours  is  that they  have  taken place  at the national  level,  leaving  no 
15. See Hart  (1987); Konig and Pohlmeier  (1988); Freeman  (1998). 
16. Calmfors (1985); Hoel (1987); Houpis (1993). See also Booth and Ravallion 
(1993); Booth and Schiantarelli  (1987). Jennifer  Hunt  355 
natural control group and constraining analysts to use time series.  A set 
of papers that uses time series on manufacturing for European countries, 
including  Germany,  estimates  employment  elasticities  with respect to 
standard hours of between  -0.2  and  -  1.0,  and elasticities  of  actual 
hours per worker of between 0.8  and 1. 1.17  However,  some time-series 
studies  of  Germany and one  of  Japan find either no employment  re- 
sponse  or positive  elasticities.18  Some  papers that use British data re- 
lying  on variation in standard hours across industries also find no em- 
ployment  response. 19 
As  for time-series  studies  of  the response  of  wages,  Harmen Leh- 
ment's  study of Germany implies  a positive  relation between  standard 
hours and wages,  whereas  Wolfgang  Franz and Werner Smolny's  in- 
dustry-by-industry study of Germany suggest the opposite,  as do studies 
of Scandinavian manufacturing.20 For France, analysis  of the 1982 re- 
ductions  in hours is  made particularly difficult  by  other concomitant 
measures,  such as a wage  freeze.21 
For the United  States,  Stephen  Trejo and Daniel  Hamermesh  find 
that an increased  overtime  premium  is  partially  reflected  in  a lower 
wage,  but that hours worked per week  are nevertheless  reduced.22 
The difficulties  inherent in studying a nationwide change in standard 
hours make Germany an attractive country for study.  Elsewhere,  I use 
individual-level  data from the  German Socio-Economic  Panel  of  the 
Deutsches  Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung  (the German Institute for 
Economic  Research),  as well  as a panel  of  industries,  to exploit  the 
cross-sectional  variation in reductions  in standard hours.23 I consider 
most of these  reductions  to be exogenous,  since  for each industry re- 
ductions subsequent to the initial one were agreed in advance and could 
not be renegotiated.  I find that cuts in standard hours translated almost 
one for one into reductions  in actual hours per worker. I also find that 
17. Hart  and  Sharot  (1978); Faini and  Schiantarelli  (1985); Franz  and  Konig (1986); 
Wadhwani  (1987); DeRegt (1988). 
18. See Konig and Pohlmeier (1987,  1988, 1989); Entorf, Konig, and Pohlmeier 
(1992); Brunello  (1989). 
19. See Hart  (1987); Hart  and Wilson (1988). 
20.  Lehment  (1991); Franz  and  Smolny  (1994). On Sweden, see Pencavel  and  Hoimn- 
lund (1988);  Nymoen  (1989). 
21.  See the discussion in Cette and Taddei  (1997, pp. 105-11). 
22.  Trejo (1991);  Hamermesh and Trejo (1997). 
23.  Hunt  (forthcoming).  On the German  Socio-Economic  Panel, see Wagner,  Burk- 
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when  standard hours  were  reduced  by  one  hour,  straight-time  real 
hourly  wages  rose  between  2  and  2.4  percent  relative  to  wages  in 
industries  with  no reduction  in standard hours.  Since  a one-hour  fall 
from forty hours is equivalent  to 2.5  percent,  this implies  close  to full 
wage  compensation.  Thus  workers  in  industries  affected  by  work- 
sharing were able to keep pace with the rising real monthly earnings of 
workers in unaffected  industries,  and so contributed to even more rap- 
idly rising hourly real wages.  Overall real monthly earnings rose by 14 
percent  over  the  period  1984-94.24  Finally,  my  results  suggest  that 
reductions in standard hours were associated with employment declines, 
although the magnitudes of these decreases  are imprecisely  estimated. 
Empirical  Findings for  Labor Supply 
The effect  of  work-sharing  on spousal  labor supply  has not previ- 
ously  been examined.  Since the average hours of women is lower than 
that of  men,  and in particular, since  women  are much more likely  to 
work part time  or not at all,  it  is  logical  to look  for  a spousal  labor 
supply response among wives.  In light of the result that something close 
to full wage compensation  occurred in Germany, there is unlikely to be 
a substantial income  effect  for the wives  of men whose  standard hours 
were reduced.  If spouses  are substitutes  in household  production,  the 
wives  may nevertheless  increase their labor supply, whereas if comple- 
mentarity in leisure  is  important,  the reverse  may occur.  I test these 
possibilities  with data from the German Socio-Economic  Panel,  using 
self-reported standard weekly hours and "average'  actual weekly hours 
for the period  1984-94. 
I take a sample  of  women  aged between  twenty  and fifty-five  who 
have  spouses  or domestic  partners in the same age range.  In order to 
focus in a simple way on the effect of changes in full-time hours, I drop 
observations  where the partner's standard hours per week  are less  than 
thirty-five  (10  percent).  I also  drop observations  where  the partner's 
standard  hours  are greater  than forty-five-to  reduce  measurement 
error,  since  the  maximum  standard hours  in  this  period  should  be 
forty-and  where the partner is self-employed  or works in agriculture. 
This choice  of sample avoids most retirements and school-to-work  tran- 
sitions  on the part of  the woman.  The inclusion  of  domestic  partners 
24.  Institut  der Deutschen  Wirtschaft  (1995). Jennifer  Hunt  357 
Table  2. Effect of Partner's Hours on Probability  of Employment  of 
German  Women,  1984-94a 
Mean of  Regression method 
independent 
Independent variable  variable  OLS  OLS  IVb  OLS 
Partner's standard hours  39.2  0.0008  0.0005 
(1.4)  (0.0027)  (0.0028) 
Partner's actual hours  41.7  0.0017  0.0010 
(7.5)  (0.0004)  (0.0033) 
Log of partner's hourly wagec  2.94  -0.052 
(0.38)  (0.010) 
Dummy variable 
Child aged 0-1  present  0.09  -0.338  -0.338  -0.338  -0.340 
(0.28)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Child aged 2-6  present  0.28  -0.178  -0.178  -0.178  -0.177 
(0.45)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Child aged 7-11  present  0.26  -0.059  -0.059  -  0.059  -  0.055 
(0.44)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Domestic partner not  0.07  0.202  0.202  0.202  0.206 
spouse  (0.26)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.020) 
Summary statistic 
)R2  0.03  0.03  0.04 
Number of observations  17,202  17,202  17,202  17,202  15,978 
Number of individualsd  3,369  3,369  3,369  3,369  3,268 
Source: Author's regressions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel described in Wagner, Burkhauser, and 
Behringer (1993). 
a. Dependent variable is a dummy, set equal to one for women who are employed in a given year (mean =  0.53).  The 
panel spans the period 1984-94.  All specifications include individual fixed effects,  women's education dummies and age 
spline, year dummies, and partner industry dummies. Numbers in parentheses are standard  deviations or standard  errors. 
b. Instrumental  variable specification, using partner's standard  hours as the instrument for partner's actual hours. 
c.  Hourly wage is monthly wage divided by (4.33  x  actual weekly hours). 
d. Each individual is observed for a number of years. 
does  not affect  the analysis.  Table  2 shows  results for a fixed effects 
linear  probability  analysis  of  the  employment  probability  of  these 
women.  The proportion of  women  working  is  53  percent,  so  the ap- 
proximation given  by this model will  be good.  All regressions  include 
information about the presence of children in the household,  the age of 
the woman,  the education  of  the woman,  year dummies,  whether the 
woman is married to her partner, and thirty dummies for the partner's 
industry; not all coefficients  are reported. 
The first column  in table 2 shows  some  of the means of the sample 
used.  The  mean  for  standard hours of  partners is  39.2,  but over  the 
period the mean fell  from 40.2  to 38.3.  More descriptive  statistics  are 
given  below.  The second  column  presents a reduced-form estimate  of 
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woman  working.  This estimate  is insignificant.  I am interested  in the 
effect  of changes  in partners' actual hours caused by changes  in part- 
ners' standard hours (the other main cause of change in actual hours is 
change  in overtime  hours).  This  is best  captured by  a regression  in- 
cluding  partner actual  hours  as  a covariate,  instrumented by  partner 
standard hours. Therefore in the second  specification  I include partner 
actual hours rather than partner standard hours,  and in the third speci- 
fication  I instrument this with partner standard hours.  The coefficient 
on actual hours in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is positive 
and significant,  indicating  that a one-hour  fall  in the partner's actual 
hours is associated  with a fall of 0.0017  in the woman's  probability of 
working-a  small  effect.  Instrumenting causes  the  standard error to 
rise,  so that the effect  is insignificant,  as in the reduced-form version 
of  the  first column.  One therefore  cannot confidently  attribute to the 
partner's standard hours an effect  on the woman's  employment  proba- 
bility:  the  effect  of  actual  hours  in  the  OLS  specification  could  be 
identified by changes  in overtime,  for example. 
The  final column  adds the log  of  the partner's hourly wage  to the 
covariates.  In this regression the sample size is smaller than the sample 
of the first three columns,  where,  due to the large number of missings 
in  the  wage  variable,  I do  not  exclude  observations  with  a missing 
wage.  The hourly wage  is computed by dividing  monthly earnings by 
4.33  times  actual weekly  hours.  Since  it is known to have changed as 
part of  the work-sharing  program,  I prefer specifications  that do not 
include  this  wage  and I omit  it in the  first three regressions  shown. 
When the wage  is included  in the instrumental variables specification 
(not  reported),  its  coefficient  is  insignificant  and the  coefficient  on 
actual hours is unchanged.  I present instead a reduced-form OLS spec- 
ification.  Here the wage effect  is significantly  negative  and quite large, 
but it does  not affect  other coefficients.  The sample  size  is smaller in 
this regression,  since,  due to the large number of missings  in the wage 
variable,  I do not exclude  observations  with a missing  wage  from the 
sample of the first three columns. 
I am interested not only  in whether a woman works,  but also in her 
hours.  For ease  of  interpretation,  I present in table 3 results  of  fixed 
effects  on observations only of women with positive hours. When work- 
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Table  3. Effect of Partner's Hours on Hours Worked  by German Women  with 
Positive  Hours,  1984-94a 
Mean of 
indpenean  ofRegression  method 
independent 
Independent variable  variable  OLS  OLS  IVb  OLS 
Partner's  standard  hours  39.2  0.186  0.116 
(1.5)  (0.088)  (0.089) 
Partner's  actual  hours  41.8  0.143  0.211 
(6.9)  (0.015)  (0.096) 
Log of partner's  hourly  wagec  2.92  -2.75 
(0.36)  (0.34) 
Dummy  variables 
Child  aged  0-1 present  0.03  -  3.40  - 3.49  - 3.53  -  3.38 
(0.16)  (0.57)  (0.57)  (0.65)  (0.58) 
Child  aged 2-6 present  0.18  - 6.74  - 6.68  - 6.66  - 6.69 
(0.39)  (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.34)  (0.32) 
Child  aged 7-11 present  0.22  -  3.55  -  3.50  -  3.49  -  3.31 
(0.41)  (0.30)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (0.31) 
Domestic  partner  not  0.12  -0.24  -0.23  -0.22  -0.32 
spouse  (0.32)  (0.55)  (0.55)  (0.49)  (0.57) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Number of observations  9,055  9,055  9,055  9,055  8,440 
Number  of individualsd  2,299  2,299  2,299  2,299  2,224 
Source: Author's regressions using data from the German Socio-Economic  Panel. 
a. Dependent variable is average actual weekly  hours worked (mean  =  31.4).  The annual panel spans 1984-94  and 
includes only women who report positive average hours in a given year. All specifications include individual fixed effects, 
women's education dummies and age spline,  year dummies, and partner industry dummies. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard  deviations or standard  errors. 
b. Instrumental  variable specification, using partner's standard  hours as the instrument for partner's actual hours. 
c.  Hourly wage is monthly wage divided by (4.33  x  actual weekly hours). 
d. Each individual is observed for a number of years. 
very similar  in magnitude  and significance, while tobit results (without 
fixed effects) yield significant  coefficients of the same signs. 
The specifications  of table 3 differ from those in table 2 only in the 
dependent  variable. The first  column presents  means, while the second 
shows that  including  the partner's  standard  hours  directly in the regres- 
sion suggests that a one-hour  reduction  in the partner's  standard  hours 
produces a statistically significant reduction of 0. 19 hours for the 
woman. If instead  the partner's  actual  hours  are  included  the coefficient 
is more significant. The instrumental  variables results from the third 
equation  suggest that  a one-hour  reduction  in the partner's  actual  hours 
is associated with a 0.21-hour reduction  in the woman's actual hours; 
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When  the wage is included  in the instrumental  variables  specification 
(not reported),  its coefficient and  the coefficient on partner  actual  hours 
are both insignificant. When the wage is included in the OLS specifi- 
cation, as reported  in the final column, its coefficient is negative and 
significant, while the coefficient on partner  standard  hours falls,  al- 
though not significantly. Most of this fall is due to the inclusion of the 
wage rather  than to the reduction  in the sample size. 
Reductions  in the standard  hours  of full-time male workers  seem thus 
to have had no effect on the employment  rate of women, but to have 
lowered  somewhat  the hours  of women  who do work. Regression  results 
not reported  indicate  that  the magnitude  of this hours  response  is smaller 
for women with small children and also for women with a university 
education. 
I have also used the German  Socio-Economic  Panel data  to examine 
the effect of standard  hours on the probability  of having a second job, 
using both a linear probability  model with fixed effects and a fixed 
effects conditional  logit model. I use the same sample  as in the analysis 
of desired hours below. The effect is insignificant,  but given that only 
2.5 percent  of the sample hold a second job, it is likely that any effect 
would be very small in comparison  with the sample size. I therefore  do 
not report  these results here (they are available  on request). 
Explanations for Differences in Full-Time Hours 
Hours may differ across countries either because the desired hours 
of employers or workers  differ, or because the ability of employers or 
workers  to obtain their desired hours varies. From industrial  relations 
accounts, it would appear  that if employers' desired hours are falling, 
they are doing so more slowly than those of workers, since the drive 
for lower hours is generally led by unions and resisted by employers. 
Institutional  Differences 
If it is  assumed that workers generally desire shorter hours, the 
relative strengths  of employers and unions across countries  will play a 
role in the evolution of hours. The OECD  reports  that  for a set of eleven 
countries for which data are available, the correlation  between trade Jennifer  Hunt  361 
union density and changes in annual hours between the most recent 
cyclical troughs  in each is  -  0.43.25 
Bell offers some reasons for the different fortunes of work-sharing 
in the United States and Europe.26  In the United States unemployment 
is only a cyclical-as  opposed to a permanent-cause of concern, and 
unemployment  spells are shorter. Unions are weak and decentralized, 
and  the government  intervenes  little in the labor  market  on issues related 
to work hours. Besides, Americans  may want to work more hours  than 
do Europeans,  even apart  from unemployment  considerations. 
The differences between Germany, where reductions in full-time 
hours  have been carried  the furthest,  and  France,  where  reductions  have 
been between those of Germany  and those of the United States, are 
more subtle but also appear  to be importantly  related  to union strength. 
In France, union membership  fell from 22 percent  in 1970 to 9 percent 
in  1992,  although, as in Germany, coverage is  about 90 percent.27 
French  workers  do not have one voice speaking for them, at either the 
industry  or the firm  levels, but rather  they are represented  by the three 
voices of the national  unions. These unions have been divided on im- 
portant  aspects of work-sharing,  such as at what level of centralization 
to bargain  and whether  to establish overtime quotas. 
Unemployment  rates  have been higher  in France  than  in Germany  in 
recent  years, so if French  unions and  workers  believe that  work-sharing 
enhances  employment,  they should  have been pushing  hard  for reduced 
hours. In fact, the French  unions do not seem to have pushed as hard 
as the German  unions. This could reflect realization of their lack of 
strength,  hope that the government  would again step in, greater  oppo- 
sition to the necessary flexibility concessions, or desire to work more 
hours relative to German  workers. 
The French  government's  reduction  of hours  in 1982 may have been 
more disruptive  than reductions  arising from negotiation  between em- 
ployers and unions, which, in turn, may have reduced  enthusiasm  for, 
or increased  opposition to, further  reductions.  First, the reduction  was 
rather  large, once the increased vacation time is taken into account. 
25.  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,  "Flexibility 
of Working  Hours:  Latest Trends  and Policy Initiatives," Employment  Outlook, 1998 
(forthcoming). 
26.  Bell (1995). 
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Second,  the same reductions were imposed on all firms and industries. 
Third,  they  occurred  earlier  than  if  agreements  had been  reached 
through  employer-union  negotiations:  in Germany,  employers  were 
able to resist reductions  in hours until the worst of  the recession  had 
passed,  whereas  in  France  the  reductions  were  implemented  in  the 
middle  of  the recession.  To the extent  that success  is judged  by eye- 
balling national unemployment statistics,  the French effort was doomed 
to be judged  a failure,  while  the German program had a much better 
chance of appearing to succeed. 
Determinants  of Desired  Hours 
Since  industrial composition  varies  across  the countries  under dis- 
cussion,  employers'  desired hours could vary for technological  reasons. 
Within-industry technology  probably differs little across rich countries, 
but desired  hours for the same  industry might  differ  across  countries 
due to variation in fixed costs per worker. Payroll tax rates vary across 
countries.  As important as the level  of the tax, though, is the maximum 
earnings  for contribution  purposes,  which  determines  the fraction  of 
workers for which the payroll tax is a fixed cost. The BLS reports social 
insurance  expenditures  and other labor taxes  as  a percent  of  hourly 
compensation  costs  for  production  workers  in  manufacturing.28 For 
1996 these figures were 21.4  percent in the United States, 24.9  percent 
in western Germany, and 31. 1 percent in France. The lowest thresholds 
for a large payroll tax in these countries were $32,181  for the old-age 
pension  in France (an 8.2  percent payroll tax) and $49,037  for the 6.8 
percent health insurance payroll tax in Germany.29 This  suggests  that 
French employers  might have the greatest incentive to resist reductions 
in hours. 
The structure of overtime premiums will  also influence the employ- 
er's  trade-off  between  hours  and workers.  In  the  United  States  the 
premium is legislated  at 50 percent,  while  in France it is legislated  at 
25 percent for the first eight hours per week  and 50 percent thereafter. 
In Germany premiums are bargained at the industry level  and are typi- 
28.  These data are available on the worldwide web page of the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics. 
29.  I use current  exchange  rates  from  the BLS to convert  thresholds  reported  in U.S. 
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cally  set at 25 percent for weekday  overtime,  although in some indus- 
tries the premium rises  with the number of  hours of  overtime.  Based 
on these considerations  alone,  one would expect  there to be less  over- 
time in the United States. 
Simple support for the idea that workers in different countries desire 
different hours comes from Bell  and Freeman's tabulation of responses 
to the International Social  Survey  Program's  (ISSP)  question  on this 
subject.30 The  ISSP  asks  working  respondents  (including  part-time 
workers) whether they would prefer to stay with their current hours and 
pay, work more hours for more pay, or work less for less pay. Despite 
the fact that Americans  already work more hours and Germans work 
fewer,  33 percent of American respondents wanted to work more and 
only 6 percent wanted to work less in 1989,  while only  13.5 of German 
respondents  wanted  to  work  more  and  10.1  percent wanted  to  work 
less.  In linking these results with work-sharing,  however,  the issue  of 
wage  compensation  should  be  considered.  The  evidence  that hourly 
wages  in Germany rose enough  to offset  reduced hours has been  dis- 
cussed  above.  Thus  work-sharing  should  be  seen  as choosing  a new 
wage-leisure  bundle,  rather than choosing  leisure  conditional  on  the 
wage,  as is implicit  in the ISSP question. 
Bell  and Freeman  hypothesize  that workers  in  different  countries 
may  desire  different  hours due to  different  distributions  of  wages.31 
Their theory is based on the idea that although an extra hour of work 
may move  individuals  in different  countries  a similar number of  per- 
centiles  up the earnings  distribution,  the payoff  to that move  differs. 
High  earnings  inequality  implies  a larger monetary  gain  to  a given 
percentile climb,  and hence a greater incentive  to increase hours. They 
assemble intriguing evidence  that links annual hours of full-time  work- 
ers (and all workers) with wage  inequjality, using ISSP data pooled  for 
1985-89.  This link holds  promise for explaining  recent trends, as the 
United States was the only rich country with rising wage  inequality  in 
the 1970s,  and since  1980, Britain alone has surpassed the United States 
in the growth of inequality.32 By contrast, they do not find support for 
30.  Bell and  Freeman  (1995) describe  the ISSP as a collaborative  program  involving 
research  institutes  that  conduct  annual  surveys  of social attitudes  and values in different 
countries.  Note that  their sample  does not include  France. 
31.  Bell and Freeman  (1995, 1996). 
32.  See Katz, Loveman,  and  Blanchflower  (1995); Gottschalk  and  Smeeding  (1997). 364  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
the hypothesis  that countries with higher wage levels  have lower hours; 
that is,  the income  effect  story. 
Desired  Hours  in Germany 
Information  on  desired  hours  from  the  German  Socio-Economic 
Panel may be used to assess the extent to which desired and actual hours 
have  converged  in Germany.  If the hourly wage  were  not changing, 
closer  alignment  of  actual  and desired  hours  would  indicate  higher 
utility of workers and would  lend support to the hypothesis  that hours 
are falling  because  workers desire to work fewer hours. An alternative 
hypothesis  would be that although most workers do not desire to work 
fewer hours, they have not opposed union leaders acting in the interest 
of those most likely  to be laid off  in the absence of work-sharing.  The 
fact that the real hourly wage  is changing,  however,  complicates  the 
interpretation. Work-sharing has reduced the hours of affected German 
workers and at the same time has allowed  their real monthly earnings 
to grow  as rapidly as those  of unaffected  workers,  which  presumably 
means that it has raised their utility.  A larger gap between  actual and 
desired hours could be consistent  with this if the union objective  were 
in fact to  increase  the hourly wage,  which  could  only  be  achieved  if 
disguised  as a work-sharing measure. 
I use a sample of workers reporting standard hours of at least thirty- 
five per week  (full time)  and no more than forty-five.  I exclude  young 
workers  (those  under eighteen),  apprentices,  the  self-employed,  and 
agricultural workers. I distinguish between manufacturing and services, 
and between  salaried workers and those who are paid by the hour. The 
survey asks working respondents how many hours per week they would 
like to work, recognizing  that increasing or decreasing their hours will 
affect earnings "correspondingly."'  I use data for the period from 1985 
(the first year in which the question was asked) through 1994. 
Table  4  shows  how  standard,  actual  and  desired  weekly  hours 
evolved  between  1985 and 1994 for different types of worker.33 Stan- 
33.  Sample weights are used in both tables 4 and 5. This weighting makes consid- 
erable difference  to the desired hours, since foreigners, who are oversampled,  want to 
work more than natives. A number  of workers  in the sample  report  actual  hours  below 
twenty or even ten for 1985-89, but there  are no such observations  over 1990-94. For 
the purposes  of comparing  the means  only, I drop  observations  with actual  hours  of less 
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Table  4. Average  Standard, Actual, and Desired Hours in Germany,  by Type of 
Worker,  1985 and 1994a 
Hours  per week 
Actual  less 
desired 
Absolute  Sample 
Worker  type  Year  Standard  Actual  Desired  Value  value  size 
Paid hourly 
Manufacturing  1985  40.0  42.5  38.5  4.0  5.1  1316 
(1.1)  (4.5)  (7.0)  (8.1)  (7.5) 
1994  37.9  40.5  37.9  2.5  3.9  944 
(1.5)  (5.3)  (4.9)  (6.1)  (5.4) 
Services  1985  40.0  42.8  37.4  5.4  6.9  316 
(1.2)  (5.2)  (9.5)  (9.9)  (8.9) 
1994  38.8  41.1  37.9  3.2  4.7  208 
(1.5)  (4.3)  (6.7)  (7.7)  (6.8) 
Salaried 
Manufacturing  1985  39.9  44.1  37.6  6.5  7.6  366 
(0.9)  (6.3)  (7.0)  (8.8)  (7.8) 
1994  37.9  42.3  38.4  3.9  5.3  362 
(1.5)  (5.1)  (5.8)  (6.6)  (5.5) 
Services  1985  40.0  42.6  35.5  7.1  7.4  667 
(0.9)  (5.4)  (7.7)  (8.5)  (8.9) 
1994  38.5  41.8  36.1  5.7  6.2  667 
(1.1)  (5.3)  (5.9)  (6.7)  (6.3) 
Source: Author's calculations using data from the German Socio-Economic  Panel. 
a. Sample weights are used. Sample excludes workers reporting  fewer than eighteen average actual weekly hours. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
dard  hours  stood at forty in 1985 and  fell by two hours  in manufacturing 
and somewhat less in services. Actual hours are higher, on average, 
than standard  hours and also fell by about  two hours  in manufacturing. 
In services actual  hours  fell by more than  did standard  hours  for hourly 
paid workers, whereas for salaried workers, actual hours fell by less 
than  did standard  hours. Desired hours  fell by 0.6 hours  for hourly  paid 
workers in manufacturing,  but rose for other workers. The difference 
between actual  and desired  hours  decreased  for all types of worker, but 
the absolute value of this difference is  a better proxy for workers' 
satisfaction with their hours. The absolute value of the difference fell 
for all types of worker, but by less than the difference. 
Table 5 shows the proportions  of respondents  whose desired hours 
are  less than, the same as, and  greater  than  their  actual  hours. I consider 366  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Table  5. Proportions  of German Workers  Desiring to Work  More Than, the Same as, 
and Less Than Their Actual Hours, 1985 and 1994a 
Percent 
Desired  hours 
Worker type  Year  More  Same  Less  Sample size 
Salaried,  services  1985  5.6  28.8  65.7  687 
1994  7.5  22.0  70.5  667 
Salaried,  manufacturing  1985  12.1  22.8  65.1  386 
1994  16.5  19.2  64.3  362 
Paid  hourly,  services  1985  12.2  35.2  52.6  325 
1994  20.3  32.3  47.4  208 
Paid  hourly,  manufacturing  1985  12.1  38.7  49.2  1364 
1994  17.4  33.7  48.9  944 
By hours worked 
Less than  40  1985  64.2  14.1  21.8  187 
1994  28.8  39.0  32.2  517 
Exactly  40  1985  6.0  69.7  24.3  749 
1994  3.7  55.5  40.9  227 
More  than  40  1985  7.4  6.1  86.5  428 
1994  6.2  8.2  85.6  200 
Source: Author's calculations using data from the German Socio-Economic  Panel. 
a. Sample weights are used. 
a worker's actual and desired hours to be the same if the gap between 
the two is half an hour or less.  Breaking down responses by type of 
worker, the table indicates that large proportions  of workers want to 
work less, larger  than are revealed by the International  Social Survey 
Program.34  The proportion  of workers  who want to work less declined 
between 1985 and 1994, except for salaried  services workers.  However, 
for all types of worker, the proportion  for whom desired and actual 
hours are the same fell,  and the proportion  who want to work more 
rose.35 
Table 5 also breaks  down further  the responses  of hourly  paid work- 
ers in manufacturing,  according  to whether  actual  hours  are more  than, 
less than, or equal to forty hours per week. In 1985, 64.2 percent of 
those working  less than  forty hours  wanted  to work more, 69.7 percent 
34.  Bell and Freeman  (1995). 
35.  Many salaried workers  receive overtime payment in days off.  If they do not 
include these days off in their calculation of an average week, actual hours may be 
overstated.  This could explain why a higher  proportion  of salaried  workers  have actual 
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Table  6. Effect of Standard Hours on Actual and Desired Hours, Germany,  1985-94a 
Hourly  paid workers  Salaried  workers 
Dependent  variable  Manufacturing  Services  Manufacturing  Services 
Actual  hours  0.88  0.82  0.70  0.87 
(0.05)  (0.12)  (0.  1 1)  (0.08) 
Desired  hours  0.29  0.44  0.32  0.25 
(0.05)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Actual  less desired  value  0.58  0.38  0.38  0.62 
(0.07)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.12) 
Absolute  value  0.25  0.38  0.48  0.63 
(0.06)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.  1 1) 
Summary  statistic 
Number  of observations  12,828  2,748  3,938  6,994 
Number  of individualsb  2,859  981  1,078  1,971 
Source: Author's regressions using data from the German Socio-Economic  Panel. 
a.  For each dependent variable and type of worker, table reports  the coefficient on standard  weekly hours from a regression 
equation that also includes individual fixed effects,  year dummies, firm size dummies, and industry dummies as regressors. 
The panel spans 1985-94.  Standard  errors are in parentheses. 
b.  Each individual is observed for a number of years. 
of those working forty hours wanted to work that amount, and 86.5 
percent  of those working more than forty hours  wanted  to work less, a 
strong  indication  of consensus on the desirability  of a forty-hour  work 
week. By 1994, when many  more  of them  worked  less than  forty hours, 
these workers were much more divided on satisfaction with actual 
hours. The proportion  of workers at forty hours who wanted to work 
less increased, compared with 1985, but the proportion  of workers 
working more than forty hours who wanted to work less  remained 
constant  at around  86 percent. 
Since the tool used to achieve work-sharing  in Germany  has been a 
reduction  in standard  hours, I run  regressions  to see how standard  hours 
affect actual hours, desired hours, and the gap between the two, for 
different types of  worker. The estimation is  performed using fixed 
effects, and the regressions  include year dummies, firm  size dummies, 
and industry  dummies, in addition  to standard  hours. Table 6 reports 
the coefficients on standard  hours from the various regressions. The 
results in the top row imply that when standard  hours are reduced by 
one hour, actual hours are reduced  by close to an hour. Thus firms do 
not increase  overtime much in response to the cut in standard  hours.36 
36.  These results confirm those presented  in Hunt (forthcoming). However, that 
sample  includes 1984, which changes  somewhat  the coefficient  for hourly  paid workers 
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The second row examines the effect of standard  hours on desired 
hours. If the wage had not changed  when standard  hours  changed, one 
would not expect desired hours to change. The regressions presented 
do not control for the wage. A one-hour  reduction  in standard  hours is 
found to reduce desired hours  by between 0.25 and 0.44 hours. In this 
and other regressions, it would be interesting  to control for the hourly 
wage. However, only the monthly wage is available, and actual  hours 
per week is the only variable  that one has for the conversion  to hourly 
wages. An hourly wage constructed  in this way cannot be used in a 
regression  with actual  hours  on the left-hand  side, as it will be correlated 
with the error, but it can be used in the desired hours regressions. I 
expected that the coefficient on standard  hours  might become insignif- 
icant when the hourly wage is controlled for, but instead the wage is 
insignificant  for all types of worker, and the standard  hours  coefficient 
is unchanged  (results not reported). 
The third row examines the impact of standard  hours on the differ- 
ence between actual and desired hours;  that is, the difference between 
the first  two rows. A one-hour  reduction  in standard  hours  reduces this 
difference by 0.38 to 0.62 hours. The fourth  row shows the effect of 
standard  hours  on the absolute  value of this difference. For hourly  paid 
manufacturing  workers, but not for others, using the absolute value 
greatly reduces the coefficient on standard  hours, so that a one-hour 
reduction in standard  hours only brings workers  0.25 hours closer to 
their desired hours. This suggests that standard  hours have not been a 
very effective tool for aligning the desired and actual hours of such 
workers. The coefficient for salaried  workers  in services (0.63) is sig- 
nificantly larger than that for hourly paid manufacturing  workers, al- 
though significantly  lower than  one. For these workers, standard  hours 
seem to be a stronger  tool for alignment. 
The weakness  of standard  hours  reductions  as a tool for aligning  desired 
and actual hours suggests that either the unions were not successful in 
their  objectives,  or that  standard  hours  reductions  were principally  aimed 
at achieving  employment  gains (as claimed)  or wage increases. 
Conclusion 
A large number  of industrialized  countries  have experienced  consid- 
erable declines in annual  hours per worker  since 1960. In those coun- Jennifer Hunt  369 
tries where unemployment  is high, the declared  objective of the unions 
campaigning  for lower hours in recent years has been higher employ- 
ment through  work-sharing.  There  remain  wide differences  in levels of 
annual  hours across countries. It has not been established  that the dif- 
ferences in full-time hours  are  related  to differences  in wage levels, but 
there is evidence linking more hours worked per week to high wage 
inequality. It also appears  that the ability of workers to obtain their 
desired hours varies according  to a country's institutions. Comparison 
of Germany  and  France  indicates  that stronger  unions have been instru- 
mental in the more rapid  reduction  of full-time hours in Germany. 
The gap between actual  and  desired  hours  in Germany  was narrowed 
by reductions  in standard  hours, but by less than one for one-consid- 
erably less for hourly paid manufacturing  workers. This suggests that 
better  alignment  of actual and desired hours  was not a principal  objec- 
tive of the unions, or else was not successfully obtained.  Other  possible 
union objectives are the declared goal of higher employment, or real 
wage increases. Reductions in standard  hours did not in fact lead to 
higher employment. But real hourly wages rose enough to offset re- 
duced  hours, so the utility of workers  remaining  employed  clearly rose. 
A by-product of the reductions in standard  hours of full-time male 
workers  was a small reduction  in the hours  of their  wives, possibly due 
to complementarity  of leisure between spouses. Comment 
and Discussion 
Lawrence F. Katz: Jennifer  Hunt has produced  an illuminating  study 
that provides a wealth of information  on trends  in hours  of work in the 
major  OECD economies over the past several decades and on what is 
known about  the effects of explicit hours  reduction  policies. High and 
persistent  unemployment  in many OECD countries  (in continental  Eu- 
rope, in particular)  has reignited interest  in work-sharing-that is, re- 
ducing hours per worker or encouraging  early retirement  to "spread 
around" available work-as  a tool for reducing  unemployment. 
The existing aggregate  time-series evidence on the effects of work- 
sharing policies on employment and unemployment  is fairly ambigu- 
ous. 
'  Hunt attempts  to fill the gap with a careful and persuasive  empir- 
ical  analysis  of the recent German experience  with work-sharing 
through  union-negotiated  reductions  in the standard  work  week for full- 
time workers. She uses variation across industries in the timing and 
magnitude of reductions in standard  hours to examine the impact of 
negotiated reductions in the full-time work week on actual hours of 
full-time workers, wages, employment, spousal labor supply, and the 
gap between actual  and  desired  hours  of work. She presents  convincing 
evidence that these negotiated reductions in standard  hours are suc- 
cessful from the point of view of incumbent  full-time workers, who 
gain increased  leisure, a movement  in hours  toward  desired  hours, and 
hourly  wage increases  to prevent  a decline in weekly earnings. But she 
also finds that such work-sharing  efforts have been associated with 
1.  Freeman (1998). 
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reduced, rather  than increased, employment. Thus her analysis of the 
German  case offers little hope that  proposed  reductions  in the standard 
work week by the governments  of France and Italy will have much 
payoff in terms of reduced  unemployment. 
I comment  on three  aspects  of this study:  first,  the strikingly  divergent 
trends  in hours  of work between  the United States and Europe;  second, 
the conditions  under  which work-sharing  is likely to be effective in re- 
ducing unemployment;  and third, the interpretation  of the German  evi- 
dence, and the implications  of the German  experience  for understanding 
the likely impacts  of work-sharing  policies in other  settings. 
Hours Trends  in the OECD. Figures 1 to 3 carefully  document  trends 
in hours of work per worker  and hours of work per adult  over the past 
several decades for ten OECD nations. There are substantial  declines 
in hours per worker  in almost all of these countries, except the United 
States. The declines have been particularly  large  in continental  Europe. 
This pattern,  combined  with declining  employment-to-population  ratios 
in much of Europe, imply enormous  divergence in trends  in hours per 
adult between Europe and the United States. Since the early 1960s, 
hours  per adult  have declined by about  a third  in Germany,  France, and 
Italy, but have increased by 10 percent in the United States. Explicit 
work-sharing  initiatives (for example, reductions  in the standard  work 
week,  increased vacation time,  and early retirement  schemes) have 
played an important  role in Europe and have been absent from the 
United States. 
But declining hours per worker  in Europe  are not just a function of 
the rise of work-sharing  plans in times of slow growth and high un- 
employment.  The greatest  reductions  in hours  per worker  and  hours  per 
adult are observed in the booming, low-unemployment 1960s. Thus 
relative to Americans, Europeans  appear  to have taken much more of 
the fruits of productivity  growth in the form of increased off-the-job 
leisure, for the past thirty  years. 
The striking differences in patterns  of hours per worker  in Europe 
and the United States also raise important  issues concerning  the com- 
parability  of hours  measures,  both  across  countries  and  over time within 
countries. Recent work by Katherine  Abraham,  James Spletzer, and 
Jay Stewart  indicates  a substantial  divergence  in trends  in hours  of work 
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reported)  usual weekly hours from the Current  Population  Survey and 
establishment  survey data.2  The U.S.  household data suggest a rise in 
weekly hours from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, whereas the 
establishment  data indicate some decline. Given the problems in ob- 
taining consistent findings on hours  trends  in the United States, cross- 
country comparisons  are likely to encounter  more severe difficulties. 
Abraham,  Spletzer, and  Stewart  also report  growing  differences  in self- 
reports of usual weekly hours and reports of individuals on hours of 
work in time-use studies. 
There are large differences in the concepts and data  collection tech- 
niques underlying  the hours series for different  countries  collected by 
the OECD and utilized by Hunt. Yet accurate  measures of trends in 
hours  of work are necessary  to understand  trends  in labor  productivity. 
Conceptual  and practical  issues in the measurement  of hours of work 
have been much neglected in work on productivity  measurement,  and 
research  on these issues could have a high payoff. Crucial  issues include 
the possibility that  the line between work and  leisure hours  is becoming 
increasingly blurred as employment shifts toward more knowledge- 
based jobs and traditional  factory jobs decline. In addition, cultural 
differences in defining  the "spheres" of the workplace  and the family 
could affect reported  hours across countries and over time. Also im- 
portant  is the treatment  of on-the-job leisure and socializing. As cur- 
rently measured, an increased tendency to consume the benefits of 
productivity as on-the-job, as opposed to off-the-job, leisure could 
show  up  as  a  slowdown in  productivity growth. Improved time- 
use studies that are consistent across countries could greatly enhance 
knowledge of trends in hours of work and also improve productivity 
measurement. 
Does  Work-Sharing Reduce Unemployment? Figures 1 to 4 also sug- 
gest that it would be interesting  to compare  the effects of work-sharing 
policies since the mid-  1980s in Germany  and  the Netherlands.  Germany 
has experienced  a large decline in the employment-to-population  ratio, 
hours  per  worker,  and  hours  per  adult, along with rising  unemployment. 
Work-sharing  has taken the form of negotiated  reductions  in standard 
hours, with little growth  in part-time  employment.  The Netherlands  has 
also experienced  a large decline in hours  per worker,  but this has been 
2.  Abraham,  Spletzer, and Stewart  (1998). Jennifer Hunt  373 
a result of large increases  in part-time  employment  (from 21 percent  of 
employment in 1983 to 37 percent in 1995) and has been associated 
with an increase  in the employment-to-population  ratio, a decline in the 
unemployment  rate, and little change in hours  per adult.3  The possible 
differences in the consequences of work-sharing  policies in these two 
countries raise interesting questions concerning the likely impact of 
work-sharing  on employment  and unemployment  in other settings. 
Many individuals  believe that cuts in the work week (that is, reduc- 
tions in working  hours  per worker)  can reduce  unemployment.  In what 
has been labeled the lump of output fallacy, most advocates of work- 
sharing  implicitly assume that output  is held constant  in response to a 
policy effort to reduce hours  per worker, so that  total hours  of work to 
be done each week are unchanged.4  Thus a reduction in hours per 
worker  requires  an increase  in the number  of workers  to reach  the fixed 
level of output, and hence work-sharing  allocates the available work 
more equitably and reduces unemployment.  Under what conditions is 
work-sharing  likely to increase the number  of workers  employed and 
reduce  unemployment?  Hunt  points out that  the effects of work-sharing 
on employment are ambiguous and depend on the substitutability  of 
hours  and  workers  in production,  the importance  of fixed costs of labor 
(costs that depend on the number  of workers  rather  than on hours per 
worker, such as some employment  benefits  and work set-up costs), and 
how wage bargaining  responds  to changes in hours. 
The best case scenario for advocates of work-sharing  posits a pro- 
duction function,  f(hN), where h is average  hours per worker  and  N is 
the number  of workers  employed, so that  hours  per  worker  and  numbers 
employed are perfect substitutes, and hourly wages (w) are constant. 
This model also assumes that there are no fixed costs of employment, 
workers  are homogeneous, and hours  of work can increase  indefinitely 
without fatigue affecting productivity.  Firms maximize  f(hN)  -  whN 
and thereby set f'  =  w. Thus a mandated  reduction  in h with w held 
constant  will lead to a proportional  increase  in N to maintain  the initial 
level of total hours worked (hN), wheref'  =  w. Output  remains  con- 
stant  and  the elasticity of employment  with respect  to hours  worked  per 
worker  is  -  1. If the unemployed  are less productive,  on average, than 
3.  Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development, Employment  Out- 
look, 1997, table E. 
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the employed, but are perfect substitutes  and are paid proportionately 
less, employment  may expand by an even greater  fraction than hours 
per worker  are reduced. 
But this outcome requires that such a reduction in unemployment 
does not affect wage bargaining  (w remains  constant)  and that incum- 
bent workers  with bargaining  power do not try to offset income lost in 
hours reductions with increased wages per hour. A reduction in the 
unemployment  rate  is likely to increase  the bargaining  power  of incum- 
bent workers and lead to wage increases that reduce the employment 
gains. Formal  models  of the natural  rate  of unemployment  (for example, 
efficiency wage models and bargaining  models), in which work effort 
or bargaining  are affected by relative  wages and  unemployment,  in fact 
imply that wage increases might fully offset the employment  gains, so 
that total hours worked and output are reduced and employment and 
unemployment  remain  the same.5  Furthermore,  if hourly  wages rise and 
labor is viewed as more inflexible, such policies could induce capital 
substitution  for labor-a  pattern  that appears  to have been important  in 
Europe since the 1970s-and  potentially lead to outsourcing of em- 
ployment, perhaps  to eastern  Europe,  with lower wages, greater  hours, 
and increased  flexibility.6 
Imperfect  substitution  between hours  per worker  and the number  of 
workers  suggests that  the employment  gains from work-sharing  will be 
smaller  than under  the assumption  of perfect  substitution  in the lump of 
output  model. Most econometric  estimates  suggest  that  hours  and  bodies 
are  far  from  perfect  substitutes.7  Attempts  at work-sharing  through  reduc- 
tions in standard  hours  (as in Germany)  do not directly  control  h, but  they 
change  the weekly hours  at which the overtime  premium  applies. In this 
case, the effect not only on the number  of workers  employed  but also on 
actual  hours  per week becomes  more  ambiguous. 
Two other  factors suggest that  mandated  work-sharing  arrangements 
may have quite limited, or even perverse, effects on employment in 
many settings. First, different  skill groups  are likely to be quite imper- 
fect substitutes  in employment. Substantial  differences exist between 
the skills of incumbent  workers  and those of the unemployed-differ- 
ences of education and training. A skill mismatch between the em- 
5.  Layard,  Nickell, and  Jackman  (1991). 
6.  On capital  substitution  in Europe,  see Blanchard  (1997). 
7.  Hamermesh  (1993). Jennifer  Hunt  375 
ployed and unemployed  implies that  poorly targeted  work-sharing  will 
be of limited use in expanding  employment  for the unemployed.  In fact, 
skilled workers could be complements with the unskilled, and hence 
hours reductions  for the skilled could reduce demand  for the unskilled. 
Second, mandated  reductions in hours below incumbent  workers' 
desired hours at going wages could lead the incumbent  workers  to take 
second jobs (that is, increase moonlighting)  and thereby fail to create 
many employment  opportunities  for the unemployed, especially if the 
employed are more attractive  to other employers. Thus work-sharing 
could simply result in the same employed workers working the same 
number  of hours on multiple  jobs, rather  than on a single job. This is 
potentially a realistic scenario in the United States, where the typical 
employee expresses a desire to work more hours at the current  wage.8 
Thus there are a number  of good reasons to believe that mandated 
work-sharing  is unlikely to produce  much of a reduction  in unemploy- 
ment. Hunt's  analysis  of the German  experience  and  Richard  Freeman's 
review  of other strands of evidence  strongly indicate that work- 
sharing-whether through  reductions  in standard  hours  or through  early 
retirement  schemes-is  not a panacea  for unemployment.9 
The German Experience  with Reductions in Standard Hours.  Hunt's 
analysis of union-negotiated  reductions  in standard  hours in Germany 
indicates that there are substantial  benefits for incumbent  workers, as 
intended. While actual hours of work are reduced, incomes are not, 
because hourly  earnings  rise in affected industries  by the same propor- 
tion as weekly hours  decline. Actual hours  move toward  desired  hours. 
And there is some evidence of better  coordination  of leisure and work 
between spouses. But there do not appear  to be any benefits for the 
unemployed;  in fact, Hunt's best estimates suggest negative effects on 
employment. 
If the goal of work-sharing  is interpreted  as being to expand  employ- 
ment, the German  experience  failed, although  incumbent  workers  ben- 
efited. An alternative interpretation  would be to view reductions in 
standard  hours  not as an exogenous, discrete  policy tool of the German 
unions, but as one component of a broader strategy to increase the 
"total compensation"  of their  members.  According  to this second  inter- 
8.  Freeman (1998). 
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pretation,  the German  unions have used their bargaining  power to in- 
crease the hourly earnings of workers in the face of a labor demand 
constraint:  that higher wages imply lower total hours employed, that 
is, a downward-sloping  labor  demand  curve. In this context, aggressive 
wage increases  require  either a reduction  in the number  of union mem- 
bers employed or reductions  in hours  worked  per employee. The strat- 
egy of the unions has been to reduce hours per employee through  re- 
ductions  in the standard  work  week, rather  than  to reduce  employment. 
The alternative  scenario of large increases in hourly wages without a 
reduction  in the work  week could have displaced  existing union  member 
employees or prevented an expansion in membership.  In fact, work- 
sharing  may have been quite successful in preventing  employment  loss 
among incumbent  union members  in Germany.  However, it is unclear 
whether  the German  experience of negotiated, endogenous reductions 
in standard  hours can provide information  about how unions would 
react  to an exogenous government  mandate  to reduce  hours  per worker. 
Hunt  has shown  the value  of getting  inside  the  black  boxes of individual 
episodes  of explicit  attempts  at work-sharing.  One needs  analysis  of other 
cases-for  example, the movement  toward  part-time  work and early re- 
tirement  in the Netherlands-to better  assess how mandated  work-sharing 
is likely to affect employment.  Most of the existing evidence clearly 
suggests that work-sharing  is not a panacea  for the problems  of unem- 
ployment. Much more work is also required  on the measurement  and 
collection of data on hours of work, to better  understand  the apparent 
differences  in the growth  of hours  per worker  among  OECD  countries,  as 
well as within-  and  cross-country  trends  in labor  productivity. 
General discussion: Richard Cooper was troubled by the focus on 
standard  week hours, saying that  in the United States  the standard  week 
only applied  to manufacturing  and  some government  employment,  both 
sectors that had been losing importance  over the past few decades. He 
argued  that a major  difference  between some continental  countries  and 
the United States is in the flexibility in employment  opportunities,  for 
example, in the scheduling and number  of hours worked. France and 
Germany  are much more constrained  by laws and conventions, so that 
the potential mismatch  between work-leisure  preferences  and employ- 
ment opportunities  is much greater  than in the United States. He also 
thought that the role of women was a significant  factor in explaining Jennifer  Hunt  377 
differences  between the United States and  the Continent.  For example, 
he believed that the relatively high U.S. participation  rate was largely 
due to the high level of female labor  force participation.  While agreeing 
that  the U.S. labor  market  is undoubtedly  relatively  flexible, Katz  noted 
that according  to the Current  Population  Survey, relatively few Amer- 
icans claimed to work between twenty and forty hours. Furthermore, 
almost 60 percent  of workers  claim to be working  exactly forty hours. 
Benjamin Friedman  added that the fraction of the U.S.  labor force 
reported  to work  part  time has varied  over time, but it is about  the same 
today as it was twenty-five years ago. Cooper was skeptical of these 
data, noting that surveys of employers showed that the average work 
week has been declining gradually. Hunt noted that a paper  by Daniel 
Hamermesh  showed that in the United States, people tended to work 
more at "unpleasant" times of the day than in Germany,  indicating a 
higher  degree of flexibility. Christopher  Sims commented  that  this dis- 
cussion indicated  that  differences  across countries  are  much  more  com- 
plicated than can be characterized  simply by differences in the means. 
In the absence of richer data, he suggested that it would be helpful to 
know more about differences in the dispersion of hours, across both 
countries  and time. 
David Laibson guessed that individuals' views on desired hours are 
significantly affected by what others are doing. With the same wage 
rate and working conditions, individuals will desire to work less if 
others are working less,  and more if others are working more. The 
expressed  desire to work less may be a "keeping up with the Joneses" 
effect, reflecting  not a change in underlying  preferences  but a response 
to changes in the standard  work week in society.  Statements about 
desired hours may reflect an individual's view of how long the work 
week should be, assuming  that all individuals  will be working  it. The 
exact wording  of questions about  desired hours is therefore  important, 
and  even with carefully  crafted  questions, it may  be difficult  to interpret 
differences across countries. 
Maurice Obstfeld thought noteworthy  the large differences across 
countries in labor participation  rates for older males. Countries  with 
low unemployment, such as Japan and Switzerland, have very high 
participation  rates for older males, which suggests that  this group  does 
not desire to substitute  leisure for work;  reducing  their work week may 
not result in reductions  in unemployment. 378  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
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